The impact of environmental innovations on firm performance is ambiguous. On the one hand, regulatory-driven environmental innovation may impose additional costs to firms and lower their profits. On the other hand, eco-innovators could profit from lower uncertainty in innovation due to regulatory standards and demand-generating effects of regulation. In this paper we analyse (a) whether regulation-driven environmental innovation generates similar innovation success compared to other types of product and process innovation, and (b) whether regulation-driven environmental innovation increases or decreases firm success( as measured by return on sales). Using firm data from the German innovation survey, we find that both product and processi nnovations driven by environmental regulation generate similar success in terms of sales with new products and cost savings as other innovations do. However, we find different effects when looking at the field of environmental regulation that triggered innovations. Regulations in favouro fs ustainablem obility contribute to higher sales with market novelties while regulations in the field of water management lower this type of innovation success. With regard to afirm's price -cost margin, new processes implementedinorder to comply with environmental regulation requirements lower profitability, indicating higher costs for this type of innovation which cannot be passed on through prices. Higher profit margins can be observed for firms with innovations triggered by regulations on recycling and waste management as well as on resource efficiency.
Introduction
It is widely agreed in the literature that environmental innovation is not only determined by market pull and technology push factors but also depends on regulatory incentives. There is an ongoing debate on how regulation-driven environmental innovations influence innovation the negative impacts of resources use (including energy use) compared to relevant alternatives. (Kemp and Pearson, 2007) The definition highlights three characteristics of environmental innovations. First, an environmental innovation has to be novel only for the firm which is introducing this innovation, which is different from novelty for the market or the world. Thus an environmental innovation can also be an incremental novelty, for example, the adoption of anew energysaving technology. Secondly, the emphasis is on results (in contrast to motivation). Thus it does not matter if environmental improvements have been the primary goal of anew product or process but whether an innovation produced positive environmental impacts. And finally, it must be environmentally beneficial compared to relevant (i.e. conventional) alternatives, for example, energy-saving light bulbs compared to conventional bulbs.
In this study, we largely follow the definitions given above, though focusing on technological innovations (i.e. product and process innovations) and ignoring pure organizational and marketing innovations. One reason is simply that our empirical data do not cover organizational and marketing innovations. But even if they would, there is good reason to focus on technological innovation since we are interested in the link between environmental regulation and innovation, and most regulations in this policy field target product characteristics and production processes.
Environmental Regulation
We understand environmental regulation as government legislation (laws, acts, directives) as well as standards and industry commitments that contribute to reducing the burden on the environmenta nd resource consumption.E nvironmental regulationsc an stimulate innovation activities of firms mainly through four channels. First, such regulation encourages providers of environmental goods and technologies (including environmental services) to develop product innovations in environmental processes. This is the case particularly if the state of the art is not sufficient to comply with regulations, thus necessitating the technological development of new products and the enhancement of existing ones. Since the introduction or modification of environmental regulation changes the conditions for economic activities, firms may see it as an opportunity to offer new products or services which help other firms to cope with these changed conditions. This is where innovations in the service sector come into play. The introduction of am andatory deposit for disposable packaging could, for instance, lead to the provision of new logistics services which help retailers to deal with returned packaging.
Secondly, environmental regulation facilitates the development of new products in the field of product-integrated environmental protection. This may apply to requirements regarding the use or non-use of certain materials, dangerous substances or other product properties (such as recyclability, biodegradability, higher energy efficiency or areduction in air, wastewater andn oise emissions).T hirdly,e nvironmentalr egulations timulates investment activitiesw hich go beyond them erei mplementationo fe nvironmental technologies in order to comply with these standards. These activities can lead to the firm-specific development of new or noticeably improved procedures in the field of processintegrated environmental protection, which aim at rationalization or quality improvements in ab roader sense. Finally, environmental regulation stimulates the development of new services which are aimed at counselling firms in environmental issues. This applies, for instance, to environmental advisors, who are concerned with environmental certifications or the assessment of environmental policies. New regulations may facilitate the development of new services.
The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Innovation
To date, the literature on the relationship between environmental policy and technological change has mainly focused on the choice of an optimal policy instrument to induce environmental innovations (Jaffe et al., 2 002) . Concerning innovation specifically, the superiority of market-based instruments like taxes and tradable permits has long been the basic tenet in environmental economics. These instruments have been identified as environmental policy instruments with the highest dynamic efficiency (innovation efficiency). Their advantage is that they give permanent incentives for further, cost-efficient emissions reductions. They are also more cost efficient (Rennings, 2000) .
However, the analysis and comparison of single policy instruments certainly has its limitations, as in most cases several instruments from several policy areas affect innovation decisions simultaneously, and regulation, among many others, is only one factor affecting innovation decisions (Arundel and Kemp, 2009) . Against this background, Blazejczak et al. (1999) berate "instrumentalism" in environmental policy, that is, the assumption that the choice of policy instruments determines the policy success. According to their criticism, specific instruments as such (taxes, permits) are typically being overestimated in the discussion while important elements of successful environmental policy are not fittingly accounted for, as there are long-term goals and targets, the mix of instruments, different policy styles and actor constellations.
Regulation has also been identified as an important determinant of environmental innovation (together with factors of technology push, market pull and firm-specific factors with market pull, technology push and company-specific factors) in the analysis of innovation surveys and is known as the "regulatory push/pull effect" (Rennings, 2000) . While regulation seems still necessary to overcome the double externality problem, it is argued that also consumers can drive innovations (Van den Bergh, 2008) . Moreover, supply factors play an important role. Concerning the decision of where to locate R&D units, supply factors such as the access to local scientific and technological resources have gained increasing importance over the past years (Horbach, 2008) . And also company-specific factors influence the innovation decision, such as knowledge transfer mechanisms and involvement in networks (Rehfeld et al.,2007) . It can be concluded that acomplexity of technology push, market pull, policy and company-specific factors influence the innovation decision of firms (Horbach, 2008) .
Against this background, the focus of this paper is especially on the regulatory push/pull effect which has been confirmed by several case studies and surveys, the latter including Green et al. (1994) , Cleff and Rennings (1999) , Rennings and Zwick (2002) , Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) and Horbach (2008) . Recently, Popp (2006) found evidence in as tudy with patent data from the USA, Japan and Germany that the innovation decisions of firms were mainly driven by national regulation, not by regulation abroad. Del Rio Gonzalez (2005) identified regulation pressure and corporate image as the main drivers of adopting cleaner technology in the Spanish pulp and paper industry. Frondel et al. (2007) find that, generally, policy stringency is an increasingly important driving force for environmental innovations rather than the choice of single policy instruments. Arimura et al. (2007) find the same empirical evidence for the effect of regulation on green R&D, that is, that stringency of environmental policy stimulates green R&D rather than the choice of ac ertain policy instrument. Facilities facing very stringent environmental regulation are more likely to conduct environmental R&D.
Thus,e nvironmental innovations are, in contrastt os ucht echnologies as microelectronics and telecommunications, normally not self-enforcing. Since factors of technology push and market pull alone do not seem to be strong enough, environmental innovations need specific regulatory support. Kammerer (2009) has shown that the innovation effects of regulation vary over different environmental issues of firms. Thus it should be distinguished between different innovation fields, for example, toxic substances, low carbon, water technologies or recycling activities.
In this paper, we want to contribute to the literature by taking up Kammerer's argument of innovations being aresponse to regulation in aspecific area. We will distinguish between power generation, resource and material efficiency, waste and recycling, sustainable mobility, air quality management, energy efficiency and sustainable water management. We want to show the impacts that regulation has in the different fields on innovation and on the economic performance of firms. And we are not only interested if ac ertain environmental innovation has been induced, but we will also analyse how far the respective environmental innovation has contributed to the success of the firm.
Data

The Mannheim Innovation Panel
In this paper, we use firm-level data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) to analyse the impact of regulation-driven environmental innovations on innovation success and firm performance. The MIP surveys innovation activities of firms from Germany on an annual base. The MIP is the German contribution to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European Commission and applies the recommendations of the OECD's Oslo Manual on collecting innovation data (OECD and Eurostat, 2005) as well as Eurostat's methodological recommendations for CIS (see Janz et al.,2 001; Peters, 2008) . The MIP is as tratified random sample (stratified by sector, size and region) of enterprises with five or more employees in mining, manufacturing, construction and aw ide area of the service sectors. The panel sample is refreshed biannually to account for panel mortality. We use the 2003 survey which contained aset of questions on external sources that may have triggered firms' innovations, distinguishing five sources: customers/demand, competitors, suppliers, public science and laws/regulations. Innovating firms were asked to indicate whether at least one product or process innovation introduced in the time period 2000-2002 was driven by the corresponding source, including an estimate of the sales share of new products in 2002 that can be attributed to the respective source. Firms stating that some of their innovations were triggered by regulations, were asked to name the precise law or regulation in afree text field. The question about the innovation source "law/regulation" is depicted in Figure 1 .
Innovations driven by environmental regulation were identified by analysing these responses and classifying them by policy fields. For regulations in the field of environmental Impact of Regulation-Driven Environmental Innovation 259 policy, responses were assigned to subfields of environment policy based (including emission protection), energy, materials/dangerous substances, water, waste, noise. In some cases, it is possible that regulations with regard to environmental protection could not be identified-this applies to specifications concerning industry-specific regulations (which may also be related to environmental protection) as well as to specifications concerning standards and rules in general.
The MIP 2003 survey targeted at otal sample of 22,435 firms. At otal of 4,538 firms provided full response to a1 6-page mail questionnaire, which corresponds to ar esponse rate of 20.2 per cent. In order to control for al ikely bias in innovation activities between responding and non-responding firms, as tratified random sample of non-responding firms were asked about their innovation activities through as hort telephone survey. At otal of 3,857 participated in this non-response survey (which is about 80 per cent of the nonresponse sample). The results of this survey were used to calculate adjusted weights for the responding firms in the main survey so that the weighted sample of responding firms accurately represent the population of innovating and non-innovating firms in each strata.
Regulations Driving Environmental Innovation
Out of the 4,538 responding firms, 2,415 did introduce product or process innovation during 2000-2002. These firms were asked on likely external sources of their innovations, including regulations. Atotal of 461 firms stated that at least some of their innovations were triggered by regulation and 371 provided details on the specific laws, directives or other types of regulations. An analysis of the texts shows that 199 firms introduced innovations that were driven by environmental regulations, mentioning at otal of 210 different regulations. Note that because of the reference period only environmental regulations introduced by 2002 could be mentioned. Since ac onsiderable amount of time may pass
Laws and Regulations as Innovation Sources
Were Atotal of 87 firms did not provide information on the source of regulation detailed enough to identify the field of environmental policy that has triggered their environmental innovations. Most of these firms simply stated that "environmental legislation" stimulated their innovations.
Remarkably, many firms mentioned regulations in the field of air quality management and emission control which does not appear among the priority fields of current environmental policy in Germany but was apolicy priority in the 1990s. Amain focus of this policy was to reduce harmful emissions by modernizing plants and introducing end-of-pipe air pollution control measures through instruments such as the TA Luft and the BImSchG. Apparently, this policy has stimulated the introduction of product and process innovations until the early 2000s. The instruments also positively influenced innovation activities in the field of activity of "sustainable mobility". Between 2000 and 2002, TA Luft and BImSchG were the key driving forces for the introduction of environmentally efficient transport technologies in Germany.
Two important areas of current regulative activity in German environmental policy were notm entioned,n amely,r egulationso nl ikelye nvironmental impacts on bio-a nd nanotechnology. This is not surprising since until 2002 no explicit regulations in these areas have been implemented. In the field of resource and material efficiency firms almost exclusively mentioned regulations which are aimed at avoiding certain toxic or otherwise harmful substances in materials and products or in the context of production processes.
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Sector Distribution of Regulation-Driven Environmental Innovation
The majority of innovations induced by environmental regulation were product innovations (82 per cent of all firms with innovations driven by environmental regulation) while 31 per cent introduced process innovations. Fifteen per cent of firms with innovations triggered by environmental regulations did introduce both product and process innovations. The only field of environmental policy with ahigh share of process innovators is sustainable mobility. Many innovations in this field were introduced by firms from the transport sector who introduced new vehicles or new process technologies (route planners, information systems, etc.) in order to provide their transport services in amore environmentally efficient way.
In the energy sector (power generation, energy efficiency), environmental regulations between 2000 and 2002 largely stimulated product innovations. On the one hand, these innovators come from utility suppliers that newly introduced "green electricity" into their product range. On the other hand, producers of machinery and equipment as well as engineering services developed or improved new technologies in the field of regenerative energy production or introduced corresponding services.
In order to elicit the sector distribution of innovations induced by environmental regulation, firm responses were weighted to represent the total firm population covered by the German innovation survey, taking into account disproportional sampling by sector, size class and region as well as differences in response rates and likely biases in innovation activities between responding and non-responding firms. Table 1reports the (extrapolated) absolute number of firms with regulation-driven environmental innovations by sector, their share in asector's total number of firms and total number of innovators, respectively, as well as as ector's share in the total number of firms with regulation-driven environmental innovations. All figures refer to innovation activities in 2000-2002. In this period, at otal of roughly 12,000 firms in Germany introduced environmental innovations triggered by regulation. This figure equals 2p er cent of the total firm population surveyed by the innovation survey, and 5.6 per cent of all innovators.
Sectors with high absolute numbers of regulation-driven environmental innovators are engineering services (including R&D services), construction, other business services (including waste disposal), real estate and renting (including car rental), consulting and advertising services, and retail trade. The highest share of firms with innovations triggered by environmental regulation can be found in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry (13 per cent of all firms). Energy and water supply is the sector where environmental regulation is particularly relevant to the sector's innovation activities, revealed by a27per cent share of environmental innovators triggered by regulation in the total number of innovators in this sector. Other sectors strongly affected by environmental regulation in their innovation activities are real estate, other business services (including waste disposal) and engineering services.
Impact of Regulation-Driven Environmental Innovations on Innovation Success
Empirical Model
In this section, we analyse whether firms with innovations that have been initiated by environmental regulations are able to achieve as imilar innovation success compared to other innovators. For this purpose, we distinguish three indicators for innovation success. 
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With product innovation, the share of sales generated by market novelties should capture the ability of firms to develop and successfully market new products and services prior to any competitor. As as econd indicator-the share of sales generated by "product-range novelties"-captures adifferent dimension of novelty, that is, whether new products have no predecessors in the innovating firm and thus enlarge afi rm's product portfolio (and most likely the group of customers addressed by afirm's products and services). Note that market novelties and product-range novelties may overlap, that is, afi rm may introduce ap roduct which is both new-to-the-market and at the same time expands the firm's product portfolio.
With process innovations, we use the share of unit costs that has been reduced by new or improved process technology. Each success indicator refers to the economic results achieved in 2002 with innovations introduced during 2000 and 2002.
Determinants of innovation success are estimated by atwo-stage procedure. In the first stage, we model the determinants of an innovating firm's ability to achieve acertain level of innovation success ( m INS, m indicating the innovation success indicator), which is the novelty of product innovations (market novelties-MN, product-range novelties-PN) and the ability to achieve unit cost reductions for process innovations (CO). The models are restricted to firms that have introduced the respective type k of innovation ( k INN) which is product innovations (PD) in the case of MN and PN, and process innovations (PC) in the case of CO. Note that not all product innovators are able to introduce market or product-range novelties. In fact, most product innovators introduce new products that do not qualify for any of the two types of novelties (see Rammer et al.,2 009). These non-novel product innovations are typically imitations of products that have been introduced by competitors before and which substitute older products within afi rm's existing product portfolio. With regard to process innovations, only about every second process innovator realizes cost savings. Other process innovators rather focus on quality aspects or implement new processes to enable the production of new products. There is also arelevant fraction of process innovators that do aim at cost reductions but were not able to achieve significant savings.
In the second stage, we model the determinants of the size of the economic returns generated by MN, PN and CO, provided that afi rm has introduced the respective type of innovation, through three separate models. Dependent variables for innovation success (SUC) are the sales share with market novelties (SM), the sales share with product-range novelties (SN) and the share of unit costs reduced through process innovation (RC).
Step two contains the estimated residual from the first-stage model ( m l * ).
Our two-step innovation success model reads as follows:
Equations 1and 2are estimated using aHeckman two-step selection model (see Heckman, 1979) . In addition, we consider amodel variant that merges both equations into one which is estimated for all product and process innovators, respectively. Since the innovation success variable in this model is left-censored (e.g. for all product innovators that did not introduce a market novelty, SUC is zero), we use aT obit model to estimate the following:
The Heckman selection Models 2and 3contain vectors of explanatory variables ( X and Y , respectively) which alter in some respect. X includes firm size (log of number of employees at full-time equivalents-SIZE) and human capital (share of graduated employees-HUC) as well as two indicators for R&D activities (one for continuous R&D-RDC-and one for occasional R&D-RDO) and an indicator for innovation cooperation (i.e. whether afirm did actively cooperate with other firms or public institutions such as universities in developing innovations-COOP). We also consider dummies for afi rm's location (East vs. West Germany-EAST) and sector affiliation (24 aggregated 2-digit sector groupings-IND1 -IND24) as controls. COOP serves as instrument, that is, this variable exerts as tatistically significant influence on the probability to introduce market novelties, product-range novelties or cost reducing process innovations, respectively, but has no significant impact on the respective success variable (share in sales, share of unit cost reduction) in the second-stage equations.
Here Y includes SIZE, innovation expenditure as as hare in sales (measuring the resources afirm devotes to innovative activities-IES) as well as indicators for regional and sector affiliation. In addition, Y includes ad ummy for process innovation (for models on product innovation success) and product innovation (for models on process innovation success), respectively, in order to take into account that in firms with both product and process innovations IES is devoted to both innovation types. In Model 3, the vector W comprises all variables from vectors X and Y .
The key variable in our models is avector for the sources that triggered innovation ( IS). This vector contains as et of dummies indicating whether afi rm stated that customers (IS_CS), suppliers (IS_SP), competitors (IS_CP), public science (IS_SC) or regulations provided essential impulses for their product or process innovations. Regulation as innovation source is differentiated by environmental regulations (IS_ER) and nonenvironmental regulations (IS_OR). Since some firms that indicated regulation-driven innovations didn ot specify thet ypeo fr egulationw ec annotd etermine whether environmental or non-environmental regulations were the drivers. These firms are represented by as eparate indicator for unknown regulation sources (IS_UR). In order to analyse likely variations in the effects of IS_ER by field of environmental policy, we further differentiate environmental regulations as as ource of innovation by seven policy fields (power generation, resource and material efficiency, recycling management, sustainable mobility, air quality management, energy efficiency, water management-IS_ER1 to IS_ER7) and an eighth category for those firms triggered by environmental regulation that did not state any specific legislation (IS_ER8). Afurther dummy indicates firms that did not use any external innovation sources (NOIS). All sources are measured specific to product and process innovation.
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All data on model variables are taken from the 2003 wave of the MIP and directly refer to respective survey questions. Detailed descriptive information on this survey wave can be found in Rammer et al. (2005) . Table A1 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for all model variables. Table 2presents the estimation results of two-step Heckman selection models on the impact of regulation-driven environmental innovations (IS_ER) on product and process innovation success. The models have been estimated using the programme package Stata 10.0. We find as tatistically significant negative impact of such innovations on the probability to introduce market novelties, while there is no impact on the share of sales generated by market novelties within the group of firms that managed to introduce such innovations onto the market. For product-range novelties and for cost reducing process innovations, we find no overall effect of regulation-driven environmental innovations, neither on the probability to introduce theses types of innovations nor on the magnitude of economic effects.
Estimation Results
When looking at the different fields of environmental policy that triggered innovations, we see that the negative impact on introducing market novelties originates from regulations in the field of power generation and-to alesser extent-water management. There is also a small negative impact for regulation-driven environmental innovators that did not mention the respective regulation in detail. Firms introducing new products triggered by these regulations-which include incentivesf or producinge nergy based on renewable technologies or provisions to provide higher quality drinking water-often adopt innovations already introduced by others before and only rarely develop entirely new products. This implies that regulations in these two fields tend to stimulate adaptive product innovations which rely on established technologies, at least in the period under cover (2000) (2001) (2002) . This result can be linked to arapid diffusion of renewable energy technologies in the early 2000s, following some policy shift from 1999 onwards after the new coalition of the social democrats and the green party took over governmental power at the federal level. For all other fields of environmental policy, no statistically significant negative impacts on the propensity of firms to introduce market novelties can be found. In contrast, regulations in the field of sustainable mobility (which are particularly related to lower emissions of vehicles) stimulated innovations which were able to achieve above average sales shares. This reflects ahigh propensity of demand to accept "green innovations" in the vehicle sector. It also reveals that German vehicle producers tend to owe some competitive advantages in marketing such innovations. Since most of these innovations originate from the car industry, this result is in line with findings on Germany's lead market position in this particular market (see Beise and Cleff, 2004; Beise and Rammer, 2006) .
For market novelties and cost reducing process innovation, we find some negative effects on the economic success indicators for these two types of innovations in the group of firms that report regulation-driven environmental innovations, but did not name the regulation that actually provided the impetus. Ap ositive impact on the probability to introduce cost reducing innovations is found for firms reporting regulation-driven process innovation, but did not specify which area of regulation triggered their innovative efforts. One may assume that as ignificant part of these firms' innovation is related to environmental regulations. These results are largely confirmed when using aT obit model instead of at wo-stage model (see Table A2 in the Appendix for estimation results). Environmental innovators triggered by regulations in the field of sustainable mobility yield significantly higher sales shares with market novelties also when considering all product innovators without any market novelties. In contrast, environmental innovators triggered by regulations in the field of water management generate significantly smaller sales share with products that were new to their markets. With the share of sales originating from product-range novelties as well as with the share of unit costs reduced by process innovations, only the group of environmental innovators without specifying the concrete field of environmental policy show lower innovation success.
When looking at the other sources of innovation, we find as trong positive impact of public science for afi rm's probability to introduce market novelties or product-range novelties. In addition, process innovations based on new research findings from universities and government laboratories increase the share of unit cost reduction. The same is true for process innovation triggered by suppliers. Process innovators that use impulses from this source are also more likely to implement cost saving processes. Firms that use competitors as innovations source are less likely to introduce market novelties (indicating that they focus on adopting innovations from other firms in their market). Customers are av aluable innovation source for achieving higher sales shares with market novelties, pointing to the importance of customer-specific products for an early market success. Firms that refrain 268 K. Rennings &C .R ammer from using external sources for orienting their innovation activities do not achieve ahigher or lower innovation success compared to firms relying on external impulses. Af urther determinant of innovation success is size, exerting au -shaped effect for the propensity to introduce market or product-range novelties, the inflection point being around 150 employees for market novelties and about 300 for product-range novelties and a negative effect on the sales share with these innovations (meaning that smaller firms are better capable of achieving higher sales shares with their novel products, which partly reflects their less disperse product portfolio compared to large firms). Continuous in-house R&D activities clearly help to develop and introduce market novelties, as does cooperating with others, which is also adriver for introducing product-range novelties, but is not helpful for introducing cost reducing process innovations. With regard to the sales shares with novelties and the share of unit costs reduction, the volume of financial commitment to innovation has as trong positive impact.
Impact of Regulation-Driven Environmental Innovations on Firm Performance
Empirical Model
This section is devoted to reveal likely impacts of regulation-driven environmental innovation on afirm's economic performance, that is, its ability to generate profits. While our previous analysis has shown that there is no general negative impact of this type of innovation on a firm's innovation success, there still may be negative performance effects since regulationdriven innovations may result in higher innovation costs compared to other innovations, for example, due to more extensive compliance requests, more complex technologies or additional approval requirements. One can also argue that regulation-driven environmental innovations may be associated with higher profits. The existence of regulation combined with regulation-related innovation activities gives environmental innovators the power to set prices for their customers since regulation can force customers to use certain types of goods or technology, which reduces price elasticity of demand. At the same time, innovation activities enable environmental innovators to achieve-unlike other providers-a higher level of product differentiation, which limits price competition and may raise profits.
We investigate the likely performance effects of regulation-driven environmental innovations by as imple firm performance model, using the price -cost margin (or profit margin) as key indicator for firm performance. As as tarting point, we use the model developed by Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010) who used the very same database. Afirm's pricecost margin (PCM, i.e. sales less labour cost, capital cost and material cost as as hare in sales) is afunction of market structure, afirm's market share and afirm's prior investment in technology (see Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2010 , for details as well as Geroski et al.,1 993, and Grabowski and Mueller, 1978 , for amore general discussion of how to model afirm's pricecost margin). We use the Herfindahl concentration index (HCI) measured at the 3-digit industry level as key market structure variable. Unfortunately, we do not have firm-specific market share information at hand. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010) used afirm's sales in the total sales of the 3-digit industry sector in Germany the firm belongs to as ap roxy for market share, but could not find any significant effect for this poor measure of market share (since 3digit industries are much too broad to identify product markets, and market shares of exporting firms are overestimated when only using sales of domestic industry). We therefore Impact of Regulation-Driven Environmental Innovation 269 omit this variable. Prior investment in technology is measured by the stock of patents (PAT) 1 as well as by past R&D expenditure over sales (RDI). In line with Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010) , we interact HCI and RDI in order to identify whether high R&D investment is used to deviate in highly concentrated industry from collusive settlements.
Further controls represented in the vector Z of explanatory variables include export activity (EXP), afirm's age (logarithm of the number of years since firm foundation-AGE), a firm's size in the previous year (SIZE_L), capital -labour ratio (CLR) and whether afi rm is foreign-owned (FOR). We extend the innovation side of this model by adding innovation success variables (MN, PN, CO) since we assume that these variables are associated with higher innovation rents compared to other types of innovations. In addition, we add the full set of innovation source variables ( IS). The model reads as follows:
The price-cost margin is measured in the innovation survey by seven categories in order to reduce the response burden and to increase the firms' willingness to provide this type of information, which is regarded as sensitive data by many firms. The seven categories are less than 0per cent, 0toless than 2per cent, 2toless than 4per cent, 4toless than 7 per cent, 7toless than 10 per cent, 10 to less than 15 per cent, and 15 per cent and more. 2 We employ interval regressions with known thresholds to estimate Equation 4. The estimated coefficients of these models can be interpreted as elasticity.
All data for model variables are taken from the 2003 wave of the MIP except for PAT (see footnote 2), HCI (which is reported by the Monopoly Commission of the federal government) and AGE, which is taken from the Creditreform database which serves as sampling frame for the MIP and covers virtually all enterprises in Germany. Table A3 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for all variables used to estimate Model 4.
Estimation Results
The estimation results of Model 4a re shown in Table 3 . Two model versions were tested. One version includes innovation source variables without differentiating whether the innovation triggered by the respective source was ap roduct or ap rocess innovation. The second version does make this differentiation for all innovation sources. While we find no effect of environmental regulations as innovation source on the price -cost margin when considering product and process innovation sources together, differentiating by product and 1 We use ap erpetual inventorym ethod to estimate the patent stock of firm i in the year 2001, assuming linear depreciation over a20-year period. We consider patent applications at the German Patent and Trademark Office as well as applications at the European Patent Office(including patents applied through the Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure). Firm-specific patent information was collected by matching the name of the firms participating in the innovation survey with the names of patent applicants using aspecial software developed at ZEW, and including an extensive manual double check. Since most firms in our sample did never apply apatent-including almost all service firms-weadd adummyfor firms with zero patents(NOPAT) and measure the stock of patentsinlogarithm (adding one patent for each firm). 2 Asignificant share of firms (19 per cent) did not provide information on their price-cost margin. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010) showed that the group of firms withi tem non-response does not significantly deviate from the group of responding firms withr espect to main characteristics (size, sector, region, etc.). process innovation reveals that environmental process innovation triggered by regulations yield al ower profit margin. The size of this negative effect is quite remarkable. The profit margin falls by about 2p ercentage points. When looking at the fields of environmental policy, it tends to be process innovators driven by regulations in sustainable mobility who perform worst. Process innovations based on sustainable mobility regulation often concern firms in transportation, logistics and other distribution services, many of them acting not only in the German market but in European and overseas markets. They are urged to modernize their vehicles in order to meet new regulatory requirements which increases their unit cost (e.g. through higher depreciation). At the same time, international competition is fierce, resulting in low price levels and decreasing price -cost margins for environmental innovators.
With regard to product innovations triggered by environmental regulation, we find a positive effect on firm profitability for regulations in the field of resource efficiency, though this effect is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level only. This positive performance impact is strongly related to firms in the machinery and equipment sector (including the manufacture of control instruments) and in engineering services. These firms develop new production technology in response to regulatory requirements to reduce hazardous material or other resource input. As their clients are required to implement these new technologies, technology producers are obviously able to add apremium over their costs on sales prices. Afurther positive impact of innovation inducing environmental regulation on firm profitability relates to the field of recycling and waste management. We find as ignificant effect on the price -cost margin only when combining innovation sources for product and process innovations, however.
Other sources of innovation have little impact on firm profitability. Aw eakly significant positive impact on profit margins can be found for firms with product innovations that utilize new findings from public science. There is also aw eak negative impact from product innovations that were triggered by unspecified regulations. As we do not know which regulations exactly were behind these innovations, it remains unclear what type of regulation actually hurts firm profitability, particularly as firms reporting both low profit margins and innovations driven by unspecified regulations do not show any industry focus.
Innovation activities contribute to higher price-cost margins. Firms with market novelties generated profit margins that are about 0.75 percentage points higher than for firms without new-to-the-market products. Cost reducing process innovations have only very small positive profit impacts which are not statistically significant at ar eliable level. Firms with product-range novelties do not achieve any higher profits. In addition, the stock of patents has ap ositive effect on firm profitability while past R&D has not. Since past R&D refers to R&D expenditure over sales in 2001 while price-cost margin is for 2002, the insignificant impact may point, on the one hand, to longer time lags between R&D investment and likely profitability impacts. On the other hand, R&D may positively influence profits only if successful innovations with acertain degree of novelty have been introduced or significant unit cost reductions have been implemented. Since we directly measure these results of R&D activity in our model, there are hardly any remaining effects of R&D on profit margins.
Among the control variables, we find the expected positive impacts of concentration, export activity, foreign ownership and age while the capital-labour has no statistically Impact of Regulation-Driven Environmental Innovation 271 Table 3 . Impact of environmental regulations as as ource for innovation on innovation success: estimation results
(marginal effects) of interval regression models
Introduction of novelties/cost reduction (yes/no) PCM (1) PCM (2) ME t -value ME t -value IS_ER a (PD ¼ 1o rPC ¼ 1) (air quality) 0.470 0.86 significant effects on profit margins. We also cannot find any statistical effect for the interaction term of R&D and concentration.
Conclusion
This paper investigated the role of environmental regulation for innovation success and firm profitability based on unique firm-level data from Germany which allow the actual regulations (laws, directives, standards, etc.) to be identified that drove certain innovations. The analysis aims to contribute to the discussion of the Porter hypothesis postulating apositive effect of environmental regulation on the competitiveness of firms. Thus we focus on regulation-driven environmental innovations. For other environmental innovations which are Impact of Regulation-Driven Environmental Innovation 273 not driven by regulation but by market demand or cost savings, we refer to other papers such as Rennings and Rammer (2009) . We were able to classify environmental innovations by the field of environmental policy that provided the main stimulus and to link this information to success measures for innovation (degree of novelty, sales with new products, cost reduction through new processes) as well to firm performance (price -cost margin). Since our data-set is representative for the German firm population in al arge number of sectors, our results provide insight into the likely role of environmental regulation for innovation on the firm level.
Theoretical considerations do not provide clear conclusions on the likely impacts of environmental regulation on innovation success and firm profitability. On the one hand, environmental regulation may urge firms to adopt standard technology and follow predefined paths of technological solutions which may reduce the degree of novelty of their innovative activities. Innovations triggered by environmental regulation may also be associated with higher costs in order to fulfil certain environmental standards which may reduce firm profitability. On the other hand, environmental regulation can reduce technology and market uncertainty of innovators and generate high demand for innovations as it urges users to adopt certain types of environmental friendly technology. Producers of such technology could be able to yield higher innovation success in terms of high sales soon after market launch. As users may also have few outside options, producers of environmental friendly technology may benefit from astrong bargaining position which can result in higher price -cost margins.
Consistent with the ambiguous results from theory, we cannot find auniform impact of environmental regulations on innovation success and profitability. Aggregating across product and process innovation, environmental regulations do neither positively nor negatively affect innovation success in terms of the degree of novelty or the direct economic results of innovations (sales,c ostr eduction). There is also no generale ffect of environmental regulation on afirm's price -cost margin. The results become more disperse, however, when differentiating by field of environmental policy and by the type of innovation triggered by environmental regulation. We find that firms with innovations based on regulations in the field of sustainable mobility (e.g. low emission standards for cars) are able to generate significantly higher sales share with market novelties. Most firms with product innovations in this field (e.g. manufacturers of cars, automotive components, railways, ships, aircrafts as well as mobility services and engineering services) act on international markets. This suggests that there is ah ighly responsive international demand for new mobility products that fulfil German environmental regulation standards. Beise and Rennings (2005) argued that such asituation may constitute alead market characteristic of environmental policy. Domestic regulation fosters innovations which are also accepted in other countries, that is, which fit environmental regulations abroad.
In twoo thera reas of environmental policy-waterm anagementa nd power generation-we find the opposite result, that is, an egative effect of environmental regulation on innovation success. In both fields, firms with innovations triggered by respective regulative requirements are less likely to introduce market novelties but rather focus their innovative efforts on adopting already existing technology. This result may either indicate that German regulation in these fields is adaptive to international standards and applies regulation schemes introduced earlier in other countries. On the other hand, al ow propensity to introduce new-to-the-market innovations could also reflect al ater stage of innovative effects of regulation. At least in the area of water management, many regulations date back to the 1980s and early 1990s. Firms that still innovate based on these standards tend to be "late followers" that introduced new products to their portfolio that have been introduced by other firms many years before.
Interestingly, we cannot find any significant effect of environmental regulation on the size of cost reductions stemming from process innovation. This means that process innovations triggered by new environmental standards are cost efficient and do not fall behind conventional process innovation aimed at increasing production efficiency. We also do not find significant effects of environmental regulation on the probability to introduce product-range novelties (i.e. innovations that expand afi rm's product portfolio) nor on the sales share generated by such innovations. This result suggests that regulation does not provide incentives to enter into new markets or open up new business fields.
The effect of innovations triggered by environmental regulation on afirm's profitability is ambiguous. Process innovations stimulated by this type of regulation exert an egative impact on the price -cost margin, indicating higher costs for firms to comply with regulation requirements for less environmentally harmful production techniques. When looking at individual fields of environmental policy, process innovations driven by sustainable mobility regulations show the largest negative impact of profit margins. Such process innovation typically takes place in transportation, logistics and other distribution services. Fierce international competition obviously restricts German firms from passing on higher costs associated with environmental regulations to customers. But there are also positive profitability effects of environmental regulation. Firms with innovations triggered by regulations on recycling and waste management are able to achieve slightly higher pricecost margins which may be attributed to more cost-efficient production (e.g. ar eduction in material costs). In addition, we find ap ositive profitability impact of product innovations motivated by regulations on increasing resource efficiency (which particularly relates to avoiding hazardous substances). As users of materials are urged by law to avoid certain hazardous materials at some point in time (e.g. the use of lead), producers of materials avoiding these substances tend to have some bargaining power over their customers which can be transferred into higher product prices.
Summing up, the conclusion is that environmental innovations on average do not perform worse compared to other innovations. This means that Porter is right when saying that environmental innovations do not harm the competitiveness of firms in general. However, if we look at specific environmental policy fields, we find winners and losers of environmental policy. For example, the innovators in the vehicle sector-for example, suppliers of the automobile industry-have achieved above average sales shares. However, the adopters of these innovations in the transport industry had to pay the costs, and may have in fact experienced al oss of competitiveness. In other environmental technology fields such as waste and recycling it may have been easier to pass on the additional cost to the customer, and in the field of resource efficiency some cost savings may have offset the costs.
Our analysis has of course several limitations and shortcomings. First, the analysis rests on as ingle observation year from as ingle country, which naturally restricts a generalization of our results. Longitudinal data would certainly be helpful in order to learn more about the time dimension between environmental regulation and innovation. In future research, we plan to make as tep in this direction be utilizing information from the 2009 Impact of Regulation-Driven Environmental Innovation 275 innovation surveyw hich again contained aq uestiono nr egulations that triggered environmental innovations. More importantly, data from other countries would be extremely helpful to determine whether the impacts found in this study are specific to German environmental policy or whether they can be found in other countries too. Since the European Community Innovation Survey conducted in 2009 contained aseparate question on environmental innovations and their drivers, we are confident that new opportunities for international comparisons on the effects of environmental regulations on firms' innovation activities will be served with promising new empirical data. 
